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Psychiatry, Hate Training, and the Second World War 
 
 November 1945. The war had been over for three months but psychiatrists and 
the military establishment were still doing battle. What had psychiatrists really 
contributed to the war effort, they asked? Had they been effective in preventing, 
treating, and managing military personnel or were they nothing more than a “soft 
touch” for all the weak, malingering, and slothful remnants in society? Wing 
Commander Philip H. Perkins’ judgment was harsh. He informed readers of the 
British Medical Journal that he had been in charge of a large section hospital during 
the war, so could reliably report that military psychiatrists had become nothing more 
than “the escape route for Service personnel from anything distasteful”. It was 
“alarming”, he wrote, to count the number of servicemen on sick parade who “ask to 
see the nerve specialist” and had “learnt all the correct answers to the 
neuropsychiatrist’s questionary [sic] well in advance”. He concluded his grumbling, 
however, with a lighter story. One day, he recalled, he came across a W.A.A.F 
wandering about the hallway looking for a specialist. “We have a very nice selection 
of specialists here”, Perkins rather patronisingly informed her, asking “which one did 
you want to see?” She replied, “The specialist in discharges”. Assuming that she was 
referring to a gynaecological problem, he noted that  
I directed her to the gynaecologist, but, alas, my intuition was rather 
like Hitler’s, slightly awry; she wanted to see the neuropsychiatrist.  
 2 
It was a “calamitous folly”, he reminded physicians, to “substitu[e] the 
neuropsychiatrist for the guardroom”.1  
Perkins’ anecdote was part of a long series of heated correspondence in the 
British Medical Journal about the role of psychiatry in war. It had been sparked by a 
withering attack on military psychiatry published a month earlier, on 13 October 
1945, by Wing Commander Kenneth G. Bergin. Sending a patient to a psychiatrist, he 
argued, was not only the “refuge of the diagnostically destitute” physician, but also 
the “first step on the downward path” towards the patient being invalided out of the 
service. He urged unit medical officers to closely watch psychiatric patients who had 
been told that they would be discharged from the service. “What a transformation we 
now behold!”, he exclaimed: the  
lame leap for joy, the blind see, and dyspeptics eat large indigestible 
meals without apparent discomfort. Why this miraculous change? 
What healing balm has been applied?  
The “healing balm” balm was the promise of a safe return to civilian life. The 
“melancholic result” was the fault of “a system” that  
permits this escape mechanism for those unwilling to bear the heat and 
burden of the day – a system which lays too much stress on 
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psychological illness and not enough on man’s responsibility to his 
fellows.  
Bergin contended that, in the past, he had shown sympathy to such servicemen and 
women, whereas the war had taught him the lesson that “disciplinary action” was the 
better response, giving “gratifying results”.2 
The fact that Bergin’s letter received such attention suggests that he had hit a 
raw nerve. The flurry of letters that followed his intervention reflected real tensions 
within psychiatry in military contexts. Indeed, this article argues, Bergin’s concerns 
were shared by many other groups within British society. There was widespread fear 
that Britain’s manhood was “soft”; there were conflicting proposals about what 
should be done about it; and debates about how to conduct war in a “civilized” 
manner raged. Elsewhere, I have analysed these anxieties in the context of the 
military establishment, the popular media, and first-person accounts of combatants 
and their families.
3
 In this article, I show that psychiatrists and psychiatric social 
workers played significant roles in all these deliberations. 
One of the problems that commentators like Perkins and Bergin identified was 
the role of psychiatrists in military training. However, it is an issue that has received 
little historical attention. In recent years, a large historical literature has developed 
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around issues such as psychiatry and war neuroses.
4
 There is also a considerable 
amount of sophisticated research on gender, including masculinity.
5
 In addition, many 
historians have pointed to the importance of that conflict in the development of the 
“psy” disciplines. The theories and practices of leading psychoanalysts such as John 
Bowlby, Donald Winnicott, Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, Susan Isaacs, and Edward 
Glover were profoundly affected by the Second World War.  
 
There have also been monographs written about the role of psychiatrists and 
psychoanalysts as social actors during the Second World War. The most notable of 
these is Michal Shapira’s The War Inside. Psychoanalysis, Total War, and the Making 
of the Democratic Self in Postwar Britain (2013). Shapira argues that, during the 
Second World War, analysts working within institutional settings such as the 
children’s nursery, juvenile courts, governmental committees, broadcasting, and 
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hospitals “helped make the state increasingly responsible for the mental health and 
family lives of citizens”. In her words, psychoanalysts 
 
informed new and changing understandings not only of individuals and 
their health, but also of broader political questions in the age of mass 
violence and mass anxiety.  Psychoanalysts sought to understand the 
underlying emotional mechanisms that led to violence, so as to 
advance human well-being, in ways that could secure the furtherance 
of democracy.
6
 
 
Psychoanalysis both shaped and was shaped by the war and the emergence of the 
welfare state in Britain. 
I agree with her analysis. The extent to which psychoanalysis – and the “psy” 
professions more generally – influenced wartime and postwar British society is 
extraordinary. Perhaps the most powerful way they did this was by their emphasis on 
childhood, youth, and mother-child relationships. Like Shapira, I also take 
psychiatrists and psychoanalysts “beyond the couch” and into the wider world. In this 
article, I analyse the part played by psychiatrists in training young men for combat. 
However, unlike the sites of political action that Shapira focussed upon, their role was 
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less progressive in military camps. In this article, I use the lens of military training to 
reflect on what Bergin and other men (and they were all men) identified as the uses 
and abuses of psychiatry in times of national emergency.  
 
* * * 
 
 With the advent of war, there was an urgent need to answer one question: what 
was the most effective way to turn civilian “boys” into martial “men”? Training for 
the rigors of modern war was crucial. Unlike the First World War, conscription was 
introduced in Britain immediately with the declaration of war and, by 1942, all male 
citizens aged 18 to 51 and all female citizens aged 20 to 30 were liable to be called 
up.  
Very quickly, military officers began complaining. Might it be the case that 
“our young men, after years of peace and pacifist propaganda, need to be mentally 
fortified by a specially intensive discipline”, some commentators asked?7 One senior 
officer reported that when he was leading his unit in Belgium in 1940, he asked a 
soldier why he had set up his machine gun in the open as opposed to behind a thick 
hedge, to which the Private replied: “Because I didn’t want to muck up that nice 
garden, sir”.8 This simply “wouldn’t do”.  
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The malaise was believed to be deep-set. Too many men were “devoid of all 
sense of duty” and “sickened only by selfish thoughts”, claimed the author of a 1945 
article entitled “Psychiatry in the Services”. He argued that the  
only solution is courage – courage on the part of the medical branch to 
stand by their convictions; courage among the higher authorities to 
stand by the medical branch and to say so publicly; and, lastly, courage 
in the hearts of the weak and selfish to face the slings and arrows.
9
 
As Richard W. Durand of the London and Counties Medical Protection Society 
reflected that same year, “the civilization which we have built up” did not promote 
fearlessness and “pluck”. He pointed out that, prior to the war, the mass media had 
emphasised the “danger of living and the necessity to conserve and preserve life”. 
Groups such as the Safety First Association, as well as advertisements warning 
against the threats posed by “constipation” and a multitude of “other evils of 
mankind”, meant that “self-preservation” had become “a natural instinct”. As a 
consequence, “courage or the anti-self-preservation factor” had to be forcibly 
“inculcated”.10 The forms of masculinity required in a time of total war were a world 
apart from that of peacetime.  
In a letter to Scottish-born psychiatrist Donald Ewen Cameron in 18 July 
1940, C. H. Rogerson put it even more bluntly. He lamented the “moral rot which has 
permeated European democracy”, breeding a fundamental “selfishness” rather than 
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responsibility. Instead of thinking “What can I give”, people asked “What do I get?”. 
As a result, they were “afraid of danger and… unwilling to do their share in the 
national effort”. The solution, he believed was to mobilize “aggressive impulses” by 
encouraging servicemen to think in national terms, including “pride of country” and 
the “country’s free institutions”, as well as inculcating love of their local place which 
was under threat. Aggressive sentiments had to be “positively aroused”. “To take the 
crudest form”, he continued, “we have not had a single good slogan, or even a good 
tune to sing since this war began!”11 
The greatest threat to combat efficiency was guilt in killing. In 1941, 
distinguished Yale psychologist Irvin L. Child explained that  
In civilian society the deliberate killing of other human beings is fully 
permitted only to executioners, and for other people in almost all 
circumstances it is heavily sanctioned. 
As a consequence, men required to kill in wartime inevitably reacted by feelings of 
guilt, which was “detrimental to the individual’s morale in carrying out his tasks as a 
soldier”.12 Writing in War Medicine in 1941, Frederick W. Porter made a similar 
point. In his article entitled “Military Psychiatry and the Selective Services”, he also 
pointed out men’s aversion to killing and its strong links (in civilian society) to 
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punishment. With the declaration of war, men had to “learn that to kill is 
commendable”. From the first day in training camp, 
he is trained in bayonet drill and in face to face combat; he is taught 
that to kill is social, commendable, and praiseworthy. This arouses a 
conflict which psychiatrists meet in many other fields – the conflict 
between right and wrong, between good and evil, which frequently 
result is an acute flare-up, catatonic in some cases and psychoneurotic 
in others.
13
 
Psychiatrists were confident that their unique knowledge could help the entire 
war project. In the words of psychiatrist H. B. Craigie (who had served in the Middle 
East), 
The question of morale… was of course of fundamental importance: 
faulty morale, indifferent training, or poor discipline provided a fruitful 
soil for the development of psychiatric breakdown…. Half-trained, 
irresolute, incompetent men are useless in modern battle.
14
 
Or, as Leonard put it in War Medicine, “even Germany, whose leader carries the 
distinction of being the most brilliant, although the most malignant, mass psychologist 
of out time, has employed Jewish psychoanalysis for her war problems”. The 
American and British war effort “cannot afford to ignore the knowledge which 
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psychoanalysts and psychiatrists have about anxiety, panic, aggression, submission, 
death, fears, etc.” To ignore them would be as fatal “to world civilization as was the 
refusal of the French army to build sufficient planes and antitank defenses”.15  
 
* * * 
 
The solution that was developed – largely by “zealous” young officers, but 
also with advice from psychologists of the behaviourist inclination – was to establish 
Battle Schools. These “schools” or training camps would focus on “battle 
inoculation” training. The first Battle School was established by the British army in 
early 1942, and very quickly – in February – a psychiatrist was appointed to it.  
The school had two aims. First, to establish a new battle drill to replace older 
methods of training that had proven unworkable. The “outworn pageantry of the 
parade ground” was useless.16 As one commentator bragged, the “old theories, the old 
methods have at last been swept away”.17 Second, to “condition students to the noise 
and fog of war’ by using live ammunition and high explosives.18 Recruits were 
subjected to real gunfire. They were forced on grueling field exercises. The typical 
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instructors was said to be a “burly subaltern of the London Irish who, his shirt torn to 
ribbons and brandishing a fighting-knife” screamed “Hate! Hate!” at raw recruits.19 
Other slogans yelled were “Remember Hong-Kong!”, “You are suffering now 
because Hitler raped Europe!” “On, on on! You must push on!”, and “We want 
leaders, not weaklings!”.20 Recruits were shown “German-issued films of front-line 
battle scenes from Poland and Russia”, including “pictures of rotten corpses and 
ragged stumps of what had once been men” until such sights and sounds became “part 
of the daily routine”.21 Instructors also attempted to stimulate “excitement” by issuing 
“blood-curdling cries” and “throwing blood about the training areas”.22 As an 
unnamed “fighting general” explained, such training was necessary because “the 
average British soldier is too placid and easy-going”: realistic training was a way to 
“set him alight”.23 Wasn’t it obvious that since “the Germans have developed a 
ruthless system of warfare”, the British forces must “match or be beaten”?24 
“Presumably”, a journalist for the Birmingham Daily Post explained, the training had 
been introduced “with the idea that one needs to be even more savage to deal with the 
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Nazi than with the old Imperial Army”.25 Reflecting back on these times after the war, 
another journalist explained that, at the time, “there was something to be said for a 
form of training which reproduced up to a point the realism of the battlefield”. After 
all, “We were fighting a tough war and needed to get rid of any naïve squeamishness 
in dealing with a ruthless foe”. It was “thought that men habituated to such ‘horrors’ 
might settle down more rapidly to the life of action required of them at the front”.26 
From the start, psychiatry was regarded as crucial to the effective operation of 
Battle Schools. According to Cabinet minutes, psychiatrists were essential because  
it was realized that adequate preparation of this kind, if conducted 
along correct lines, might act as a preventative to breakdown under 
battle conditions…. The psychiatrist, in his advisory position, exerted 
considerable influence on the development of techniques towards this 
end.
27
 
 The psychiatrists who were sent to the Battle Schools were far from being 
convinced, however. As early as June, they began issuing warnings about the effects 
that the dramatic representations and exposures to violence were having on men in the 
camps. One psychiatrist, who was asked to observe the programme with an eye to 
devising further measures, was appalled, arguing that such training “might increase 
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incidence of breakdown”. Indeed, there were “incidents of fainting and vomiting”.28 
A technical memorandum released by the Directorate of Army Psychiatry in June 
1942 concluded that 
In the course of most wars, individuals or small groups in training or 
back areas not infrequently become convinced that we must learn to 
hate the enemy and that blood lust is an important component of 
combatant morale. Fascinating as this idea is to officers and men who 
are chaffing over inactivity or struggling with boredom, experience 
shows that attempts to rouse primitive passions – even if they are 
successful in overcoming the British soldier’s sense of humour – have 
not been found useful as a method of increasing combatant 
efficiency.
29
 
The report noted that the psychiatrist’s views were resisted at the time.30  Indeed, 
instructions were circulated saying that “methods for getting men used to the sight of 
bloodshed” were still “the subject of experimentation, and should not be employed 
until further instructions”. However, it went immediately on to say that it was “quite 
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safe to give approval for volunteers to visit hospital accident rooms and operating 
theatres if they were prepared to do this at least six times in succession”.31 
In a technical memorandum issued by the Directorate of Army Psychiatry, an 
unnamed psychiatrist warned that recruits were already imbued with “exaggerated” 
images of the “horrors and dangers of war”. These men believed that battle was “so 
overwhelmingly terrifying” that large numbers might logically realize that their only 
hope was to escape somehow. The author pointed out the “inherent danger” of all 
attempts to “condition” men, especially by making it a “test of toughness”. “To shock 
him by sudden battle effects does no more than convince him of the truth of his inner 
picture”, he wrote, and therefore “the effect exactly the opposite to that intended”. 
Instead, the men must be conditioned to combat in “carefully controlled” ways. 
Training must be 
carefully graded and timed or more harm than good will be done. It 
must be clearly realized that advanced training is designed, not to 
frighten men, but to give them an opportunity to realize the emptiness 
of much of their fear. Each man’s mental picture of war should become 
one of attack with a reasonable chance of success; and the film-built 
image of shot and shell to right and left, of dead and dying comrades, 
of gas, flame-throwers and high explosives, of tanks in every coppice 
and of a sky-dark with dive-bombers, must be debunked.
32
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In the words of the author of an article entitled “Military Psychiatry”, published in the 
British Medical Journal in 1943, “toughening” training left many recruits “unable to 
respond to the demands made upon them, and an anxiety neurosis develops”.33  
As we shall see, there was also a major public outcry against the training. The 
debate started in earnest in 1942, when the B.B.C. broadcast a programme about the 
new forms of training taking place in the Battle Schools. As a journalist for the 
Birmingham Daily Post put it, “for once, the much-abused B.B.C.” had done the 
nation a service.
34
 The BBC’s programme led to a storm of protest by a vast range of 
people, including psychiatrists, throughout the UK. General Sir Bernard Paget 
(Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces) was forced to respond. After consulting with a 
number of psychiatrists (a fact that only became public knowledge in 1947),
35
 he then 
condemned the “strong and offensive language” use in the battle Schools. His main 
criticism, though, concerned “the attempt to produce a blood lust or hate”: it was 
positively “harmful to discipline”. Paget argued that, not only was there a distinction 
                                                                                                                                                              
National Archives CAB 21/914. This memo is a word-for-word repeat of “Object of 
Battle Inoculation”, c. 1942, The National Archives WO199/799. 
33
 G. Douglas Gray, “Military Psychiatry”, British Medical Journal, 1.4284 (13 
February 1943), 202. 
34
 “No ‘Hate’ Training”, Birmingham Daily Post (25 May 1942), 2.  
35
 “Stopped Hate Training”, Western Daily Press (2 April 1947), 4 and “Training in 
Hate”, Western Daily Press (3 April 1947), 5. 
 16 
between “building up of this artificial hate and building up of a true offensive spirit”, 
but that hate training was also “foreign to our British temperament”.36 
 
* * * 
 
 The complaints that Paget was responding to can be summarized under five 
headings. First, was the training really necessary? After all, men had done impressive 
service at Dunkirk and Burma, well before the training was introduced.
37
  
Second, what kind of man would the training produce? People worried that the 
schools would create “an Army of lust-maddened louts”.38 Or, as another journalist 
reminded readers, the best soldiers are not those who “’see red’” like “primitive 
savages” or “hooligans”.39 Even the Scottish Commandos – proudly known for “the 
toughest [training] given to any soldier in the world” – deeply resented any suggestion 
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that they were “thugs”, “glamour boys”, or “toughs”.40 The allusion here was to the 
British Union of Fascists’ youth movement, NUPA, with their links to European-style 
fascism. “True” British manliness had no resemblance to the aesthetics of the 
Blackshirts. 
There was a strong religious component to this objection. Dr. James 
Hutchinson Cockburn, who had only recently stepped down as Moderator of the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, protested “against the inculcating of 
personal hatred” on spiritual grounds. It was simply not Christian.41 In the Lower 
House of Convocation of Canterbury, Canon A. H. King of Norwich was critical for 
similar reasons, stating that  
Whatever may happen in hot blood, men feel very differently outside 
the realm of battle. To stimulate artificial excitement of hot blood 
seems to break up the work of the chaplains and all that the Christian 
church stands for.  
He noted that army chaplains had been distressed with the training but since they 
were “only subordinate officers”, had found it “difficult to register a protest”.42 It 
turned out that psychiatric Men of the Mind – although their views had been 
“resisted” – had more clout that Men of the Cloth. 
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Third, heightened emotional states might be counterproductive on the modern 
battlefield. War demanded “coolness with resolution”, insisted a report in the 
Birmingham Daily Post, adding: “Your savage on the battlefield, whether his 
savagery is innate or cultivated, is seldom cool and not always resolute”.43 The 
Western Daily Press agreed, arguing that inculcating “blood-lust” was “degrading to 
the soldier”, especially since “most military commanders would admit that success in 
the field depends far more on the moral qualities of the soldier than on any artificial 
stimulation of the will to kill”.44 As another put it, there was “as much need for 
coolness and quick thinking as for seeing red. The over-excited soldier who acts 
wildly is often a hindrance [rather] than a help to his comrades”.45 According to 
Brigadier-General T. N. S. M. Howard writing in The Times, 
What is the use of hating one’s enemy? Nothing wears one out so 
much as hate; and it is lasting power that is needed in war. Moreover, 
hate merely confuses the mind at a critical moment.  
He informed readers that it had “been my duty to handle a [rifle] magazine in close 
fighting on many occasions” and it was “only calm and determination” that enabled 
him “to pick at leader after leader and do my bit to win these particular fights”. He 
warned that “All this hating and spraying men with blood is a form of neurosis”.46 
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Fourth, there were concerns that “hate training” was un-British. Indeed, it was 
too closely modeled on Nazi discipline. In the words of one journalist, training 
“designed to send men into action filled with a bloodthirsty hatred of the enemy” was 
“at variance with the honourable traditions of British soldiering”. Might it not “turn 
our young soldiers into close imitations of Nazi thugs?”, he asked, insisting that 
Britons found “contempt” more effective than hatred.47 It was “wholly alien to the 
spirit which should govern the training of the British army of battle”, claimed the 
Liverpool Daily Post.
48
 The Birmingham Daily Post further contended that it was  
bad psychology because the British soldier, even when he was far from 
the flower of the nation, never could cultivate savagery. His lapses 
were accidental, the result of serious overstrain; and our best generals, 
men like Cromwell, Marlborough, and Wellington, discouraged them – 
severely.
49
 
It was “form of training is not very congenial to Englishmen,” stated Canon A. H. 
King.
50
 Indeed, the idea that hate training was “foreign to British temperament”51 
even led some to speculated that it was being driven by Russian interests.
52
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 These debates about “Britishness” and hate training had an interesting 
inflection when it came to Scottish regiments. Northern commentators insisted that 
Scottish troops – with their long “martial tradition” – did not to need “Hate Drill”. 
According to one report, their training was just as tough as those south of the border 
but they do not need the “blood, hate, death, and spilt guts” doctrine used elsewhere 
to encourage the process of “psychological hardening and arousing the fighting 
spirit”. Why didn’t they need it? Because Scottish instructors could appeal to “the 
great traditions of the regiments composing the division, the flash of the tartan, the 
challenge of the pipes playing the old war tunes”. These things would  
stir Scottish blood more than training methods in which blood is 
thrown at pupils, bayoneted dummies gush blood, and instructors are 
constantly exhorting pupils to “Remember Hong Kong” and what will 
happen to themselves, their wives and families if they don’t kill that 
Hun.
53
  
Indeed, one senior officer of the division (described as “tall, fair-headed, with a 
determined jaw and a parade voice like the crack of a grenade”) claimed that there 
were major “difference[s] in temperament between the Scot and other fighting men…. 
Our aim is fighting leaders, inspired not so much by blinding hate of all things 
German, Italian, or Japanese, as by a high pride in the great traditions of their country 
and regiment”.54  
 Fifth, this was not the first time that hate training had been tried. As Joanna 
Bourke discusses in Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain, and the Great 
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War (1996), similar training had been introduced during the First World War.
55
 Had 
nothing been learnt?
56
 Indeed, as in the debate about Scottish regiments, “hate 
instructors” in the 1940s even called the enemy the “Hun” and their emphasis on the 
threat of rape of “wives and families” also harkened back to First World War 
propaganda and the “rape of Belgium”.57  
 Nevertheless, despite structural similarities between “hate training” during the 
two world wars, their psychological rationale was very different. During the earlier 
war, blood training arose out of implicit notions of evolutionary theories, sometimes 
updated a la social psychologists William McDougall, Gustave Le Bon, and Wilfred 
Trotter. This was why Captain H. Meredith Logan, writing immediately after the First 
World War, argued that instructors who “ “taught a lust for blood” during bayonet 
practice were “trying to awaken savage instincts and encourage the strongest 
emotions of violence.”58 War was an atavistic survival from humanity’s primordial 
history. The “Beast Within” needed awakening.  
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 In contrast, during the 1939-45 war, the rationale for the training was 
influenced either by the “conditioning” premises of behaviourism or by (vulgarised) 
Freudian notions of drives. Major Jules V. Coleman explained the more Freudian 
rationalize. He agued that  
As civilians, it was “thou shalt not kill”; as soldiers they were told to 
move in on the enemy and destroy him. Such reorientation didn’t take 
place spontaneously; it follows a plan and a pattern. 
First, “the mobilization of free-floating aggression” was necessary and, second, anxiety 
and guilt needed to be controlled. These were distinctive, but inter-related processes 
since the “dominance of anxiety and guilt” would inhibit “the appropriate release of 
aggression” while, at the same time, the “factors which tend to free the channels of 
aggression” also helped the soldier “control his inner turmoil”.59  
Finally, many were concerned about the potential post-war legacy of such 
training. This worried John Frederick Wilde, distinguished psychiatrist who served 
with the R.A.M.C. during the war and had been involved in early attempts to 
inoculate men to battle. In 1943, he noted that in time of war there were “plenty of 
outlet for aggressive instincts, either in fact or fantasy”. But what would happen once 
peace broke out? Everyone possessed an “instinctive aggression” and “that energy 
must find an outlet, either creative or destructive”. He drew analogies from both 
theology and technology, stating: 
Theologians talk of original sin, meaning, I suppose, that if our 
potential energy does not direct itself into useful channels, it is bound 
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to find an outlet in what they call evil. An internal combustion engine 
can be employed usefully in a tractor to produce crops, or destructively 
in a bomber to exterminate folk. 
It was therefore imperative that “peace must also have its normal outlet for 
aggression”.60 Another commentator was more blunt: “What will happen”, he asked, 
“when thousands of young men, trained to glory in hatred and ruthlessness, return to 
civilian life after the war?”61 
 
* * * 
 
 It should not be assumed that everyone disapproved of the more realistic 
training regimes. Indeed, when the new battle drill was first introduced, journalists in 
The Times as well as other papers wrote about it with breathless wonder. Once 
criticisms arose, however, the proponents of the new battle drill increasingly made a 
distinction between the “hate” and the “inoculation” parts of the training. Harry 
Ashbrook, writing in the Sunday Mirror in May 1942, was one fan. He admitted that 
some “over-enthusiastic young officer instructors” had “allowed their feelings to run 
away with them”. These “manifestation of hate or blood lust” in army training had 
been eradicated, however. Nevertheless, it was important that soldiers were trained to 
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be “tough, aggressive, formidable in battle”. “Let us be frank about the problem”, he 
lectured: 
Think for a moment of the type of fighter our boys will one day face – 
the Nazi….. The sight of a bullet-riddled corpse means nothing to him. 
Too long has the Nazi been on intimate terms with death…. To beat 
him our men must learn how to fight ruthlessly, fiercely, and scientific 
ally. The battle schools are going that job. They are teaching the art of 
killing without hate.
62
 
The training was tough – but that was necessary. After a while, Ashbrooke continued, 
SOMETHING IN YOUR BRAIN SNAPS. YOU BECOME PART OF 
THE WAR MACHINE. THE MUD AND FILTH MEAN NOTHING 
TO YOU. THE NOISE OF GUNS AND EXPLOSIVES ARE 
FORGOTTEN. You swing round with your tommy-gun to fire at 
moving targets. Fire and water cannot stop you. Nothing can stop 
you…. THIS THEN, IS THE TIME TO LEARN THE LESSONS. 
THE POSTMAN WILL NOT RING TWICE.
63
 
In 1944, a Scottish journalist agreed, noting that “battle inoculation” was particularly 
important when training “the more imaginative” soldier. The “fresher he is to his job 
and the less inured to any discipline, the more he will benefit”, he reminded readers. 
After all,  
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the first glimpse of a tank attack may strike fear into the stoutest heart, 
but once a man has learnt to take cover in a slit trench in the company 
of someone who “knows the ropes”, he no longer feels any paralyzing 
fear when confronted with this particular weapon. 
Just as a soldier “learns to steel himself against the noise of battle”, the “familiarity 
that breeds contempt is inculcated by accustomising himself to explosive charges set 
off by an expert just, but only just, out of harm’s way”. He claimed that the training 
had “wonderful results….. it has been found to take the edge off the greatest fear of 
all, the fear of the unknown”.64 Neither firecrackers nor being fired out with blanks 
were as helpful in preparing new soldiers as the real thing.
65
 
Still other defenders mocked those who proposed “combat lite”.66 In the 
Liverpool Evening Express on 26 May 1942, the editor issued a rallying cry: 
For some time now there appears to have been a revival of the old cry: 
“Don’t shoot the Germans, they’re not responsible for Hitler”, which 
is, of course, the sheerest nonsense. Every Luftwaffe bomber crew 
over Britain, scattering bombs indiscriminately in a rain of hate, are 
just ordinary Germans who have swallowed the Nazi dope about Hitler 
and the Germans conquering the world by reason of their own racial 
superiority.  
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He acknowledged that those Britons who had suffered under the bombs  
rightly hate all that is German, and will demand when the time comes 
that these barbarians get their deserts. We hope that one result of 
General Paget’s ban on forms of “hate training”… will not be 
softening of the offensive spirit. 
He sneered at those Britons who “do not understand its [the war’s] grim and tragic 
realities” and who suggest that “we should not hate the German people, but rather pity 
them”.  He begged Paget and other senior military personnel to “make sure that the 
Army does not become the chief propagandist of this dangerous policy…. There is no 
room for sentimentality….. The army… must be hard and tough and it must hate the 
Germans as the Germans hate everything that is British.”67 
 As we have seen, these more hawkish commentators failed to convince Paget, 
who banned hate training in training camps. This did not stop psychologists from 
experimenting with forms of “hate conditioning” in treatment regimes for men who 
had broken down in combat. Films that were “more terrible than any we have seen 
and far exceeds anything the men will encounter in news reels” were employed to 
“desensitize soldiers” suffering from “combat fatigue”. It was said to be effective: it 
only took twelve showings of a film of Marines invading Tarawa to desensitize the 
men. All the patients, save one, were described as having “greatly benefited” from the 
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process.
68
 J. F. Wilde recalled similar experiments in conditioning men to “the horrors 
of dive-bombing”. He admitted that  
the apparatus was at its first somewhat crude. The patient relaxed on a 
bed in a darkened room. A model dive-bomber was suspended over his 
head, and raised and lowered by a string over a pulley, and the 
appropriate side-effects were produced by violent kicks on a tin bath 
under the bed.
 69
 
Later devices were more realistic.   
 
* * * 
 
In the end, however, all soldiers needed to be hardened and, in the words of 
the author of a 1947 article entitled “Training in Hate”, combatants could not afford to 
be “deterred by mawkish sentiment from administering rough treatment to the 
enemy”.70 However, not everyone believed that psychiatrists could help change this 
mind-set. Some criticisms took a defensive tone: psychiatrists in the military hadn’t 
been given an opportunity to shine. What serious psychiatric screening could be done 
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if they were only allocated between three and five minutes to examine each recruit?
71
 
It was even claimed that psychiatric screening often degenerated into simply asking 
four questions: How do you feel? Have you ever been sick? Are you nervous? and 
How do you think you will get along in the Army? It is probably apocryphal but some 
recruits even claimed that they were only asked one question: Do you like girls?
72
 
There were also problems of information-gathering since “early symptoms” that 
might have warned a psychiatrist of a potential problem with a soldier were routinely 
labelled “problems of discipline or ineptness” until too late.73 There were an 
inadequate number of psychiatrists anyway. Worse: many had “little acquaintance 
with milder psychiatric cases that are not seen in hospitals”.74  
In addition, psychiatry held an ambiguous status in society at the time, and 
was never fully accepted by the Generals. As the Secretary of State for War noted in a 
private letter in 1942, it was unwise to publish a report on the use of psychiatry in the 
military since such an announcement “might not only mislead the general public but 
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also cause some alarm and despondency in the Army itself by giving undue emphasis 
to psychiatric and psychological methods”.75 Many people – military and civilian – 
had only a very vague understanding of the distinction between psychologists, 
psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts. In a Cabinet paper in 1942, the author even had to 
explain what psychoanalysis was and at least one newspaper report felt that it was 
necessary to teach readers how to pronounce “psychiatry” (“sy-ky-atry”) correctly.76  
 Other commentators were more bullish, disputing the effectiveness of 
psychiatric methods in selecting, training, or curing recruits. In 1943, Leonard 
Sillman attacked fellow-psychiatrists for assuming that all people were “intellectuals” 
like themselves. Because physicians tended to have “a strong sense of moral duty”, 
reacted “emotionally to facts and data”, and were “morally decent and peace loving”, 
they were therefore “unable to visualize the necessities of war”. As a consequence, 
they were “blocked regarding the psychological necessities of war” and inevitably 
failed to realize that “to affect the emotional life of most persons and thus rouse them 
to the desire of killing the enemy demands skilful, coordinated presentation of the 
scenes, raw and gory, behind ‘the facts and figures’”.77 
Sillman was attacking “from within” the profession. Outsiders wondered 
whether psychiatrist were simply “trick cyclists”: might watching the way recruits 
played a game using dominoes be just as accurate in judging whether they would 
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make good airmen as more complex – and time consuming – psychiatric methods, 
they asked?
78
 Colonel Amos R. Koontz in “Psychiatry in the Next War” (1948) was 
also scathing about the ability of psychiatrists to help screen combatants. He argued 
that even the most highly trained psychiatrist could not predict a man’s conduct in 
battle. He reminded readers that 
We have all seen quiet, timid, almost mousey little men behave like 
lions in combat. On the other hand, we have all seen swaggering 
braggarts turn out to be miserable cowards when the crucial test came. 
Giving psychiatrists the power to eliminate men from service was leading to a “waste 
of manpower”, he insisted.79 In an article in Psychiatry in 1946, Meyer Maskin (who 
had served as a Major in the war) was similarly unflattering. Psychiatry, he wrote, 
cannot surcharge men to fight or to persist indefinitely in the stress of 
modern war; it has developed no effective field method to ameliorate 
disabling anxiety; nor will it reduce the sum of pension debentures 
[sic] after this war. Psychiatry is a medical specialism whose only 
valid claim is its capacity to improve certain mental illnesses by a 
more or less long method of personality re-education.  
His conclusion was witty, if damning: “Military psychiatry must distinguish between 
its accomplishments and its pretensions”.80 
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 Other critics drew attention to the intrinsic tension between peacetime 
psychiatry and its wartime counterpart. The latter’s “first duty” was “to consider the 
efficiency of the Service”, noted Squadron Leader P. R. Kemp.81 The role of 
psychiatrists was to cure men of the “delusion” that the enemy was a person who 
“probably had a wife and children, a mother and sisters and brothers, just like 
himself” – an idea alien to civilian psychiatric practice.82 Lieutenant General Neil 
Cantlie of the Royal Army Medical Corps was blunt about the need for Army 
psychiatrists to not only have a “good knowledge of human nature”, but also to have 
“a grounding of the military responsibilities of his job. He must remember that when 
one man is allowed out of the front line, his place has got to be filled by another man 
who must go to be killed”. The most important role of psychiatrists was to “maintain 
the fighting strength, and not to justify his existence by the number of cases disposed 
of to the base”.83 As Philip S. Wagner reminded readers of Psychiatry in 1946, 
military psychiatrists 
had to be concerned primarily with whether additional combat 
usefulness remained in a man, not with “cure” nor with solicitude for 
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the psychic pain he would have to endure to serve a few more combat 
days, not even with speculations on the eventual consequences to his 
personality.
84
 
Wartime psychiatry had little time for introspection and the encouragement of self-
awareness. It was resolutely focused on practical concerns defined by military needs. 
In the words of Eli Ginzberg, psychiatrists in the military needed to “recognize that 
they had to temper their humanitarian approach to the individual patient” with 
concern for the larger unit.
85
 
 This point may be further illustrated by returning to the debates I discussed 
earlier about battle training. As mentioned, psychiatrist believed it was their duty to 
facilitate a restructuring of the individual’s psyche in order to legitimate aggression 
and minimize psychic conflicts that went with it: in other words, to enable men to kill. 
With this aim in mind, in 1943, John Thomson MacCurdy (who was famous in the 
1914-18 war for his work on shell-shock), presented a case study of a young recruit 
who did well in military training but became extremely upset and sick when told to 
stick a bayonet into a straw-dummy’s guts. For MacCurdy, the difficulty could 
probably be traced back to his childhood. In childhood fights, he was humiliated and 
was called a “cry-baby”. As a result, he developed a “horror of violence, particularly 
of bloodshed”. As an adult, he was self-confident and, MacCurdy approvingly noted, 
neither neurotic nor pacifistic. But he could not fight. MacCurdy advised the military 
authorities that threatening, punishing, or otherwise coercing the soldier would only 
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increase his anxiety. Rather, the best thing to do was to interview the “culprit” [sic], 
ask him about similar difficulties he had experienced and attempt to make the 
“association… fully conscious, thus enabling the patient to deal with it in a human, 
rather than an animal, way”. He then had to be taught  
that a bayonet will not punch him in the nose, which was what he was 
unconsciously afraid of. He should practise jabbing his bayonet at an 
archery target or something similar which does not resemble a human 
body. A sympathetic instructor should teach him the parries and thrusts 
with wooden implements that manifestly could not make penetrating 
wounds. Above all, the instructor should allow himself to be defeated 
in such mock combats, putting up just enough resistance to prevent the 
unreality from becoming ridiculous. If the pupil can learn to make the 
various movements automatically and without fear, he can be brought 
gradually to use the real weapon confidently. 
But – and here was the problem – MacCurdy admitted that such re-education was 
time-consuming.
86
  
 The final criticism of military psychiatry in wartime was the most antagonistic 
of all: might psychiatry be part of the problem, rather than a solution? This took many 
forms, the most prominent of which was the stance taken by many military 
psychiatrists to malingering and cowardice. Psychiatrists during the Second World 
War routinely argued that men who were unwilling or unable to fight were suffering 
from a psychiatric condition. In the words of psychiatrist George S. Stevenson in 
1943, malingering was not a matter of “faking disability by an otherwise sound and 
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potentially good soldier” but was rather evidence that the man was “psychopathic”.87 
Although arguing from a more Freudian position, A. Balfour Sclare, psychiatrist in 
the R.A.F. Volunteer Reserve, agreed. A physician didn’t have to know much about 
Freudian principles to recognise how psychoneurotic symptoms developed. He 
concluded that it was “high time we realized that emotional illness can be just as 
severely incapacitating as organic illness”.88 For many senior military officers, the 
problem with pathologising malingering was that psychiatrists were providing a way 
for cowards to escape responsibility. Had psychiatrists become “the porter at the back 
door”, asked the secretary of the Medical Protection Society?89 
 
* * * 
 
One response to criticisms about their role in providing cowards and 
malingerers with a way to evade service was to become tougher. Indeed, in the course 
of the war, there was a return amongst many psychiatrists to moral treatments and 
behaviourism, a position emphasized time and again in reflections about military 
psychiatry in the immediate post-war period. For example, in one military hospital, all 
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neuropsychiatric patients were sent to the “closed ward for disturbed and suicidal 
patients” simply as “a chastening experience”. In another hospital, “hysterical 
paralyses were treated by electric stimulation gradually increased to the point of 
pain”. One patient even threatened to kill the officer in charge of the “torture”.90 
Colonel Amos R. Koontz represented another extreme. In “Psychiatry in the Next 
War” (1948), he even defended sterilizing men whose psychiatric conditions meant 
that they were unable to serve in the war.  “If such men found that they were to be 
sterilized, would not the cases of ‘nervous fatigue’ and ‘anxiety state’ markedly 
diminish?”, he asked. He continued: 
Why should such people be allowed to procreate another race of the 
same ilk while their neighbors are away fighting for their country?.... 
Some might argue that one might just as well say that men with 
physical defects, such as amputated limbs, should also be sterilized 
because they cannot go to war. Such an argument is insupportable 
because we all know that amputated limbs are not inherited, while 
mental characteristics are. Is it not time that our country stopped being 
soft and abandoned its program of mollycoddling no-goods?
91
 
The “new authoritarianism” of some psychiatrists led to an equally strong 
defense of psychiatry in war. Indeed, responses to Bergin’s letter of 1945 – with 
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which I began this article – often claimed that Bergin was being too negative about 
the war record of psychiatry. Squadron Leader (R.A.F.) A. Harris, for example, 
accused Bergin of having a “disarmingly naïve outlook”. He cited evidence of the 
“unfortunate consequences” of treating psychiatrically unwell patients as malingerers 
and stated that it was factually incorrect to claim that they were cured upon returning 
to civilian life. Bergin, he argued, was letting his “judgement… be influenced by his 
moral indignation at the gain that the neurotic may derive from his illness”.92 Writing 
from Cambridge, W. E. Hick also urged psychiatrists to be both kindly and sensible. 
He admitted that psychiatrists were liable to “feel annoyed” when “he fancies a leg-
pull”, which is why they often lunged out “by a more or less indiscriminate outburst 
of severity”. This was only natural, but it was “better to be fooled occasionally than to 
be unjust to an honest man”. When addressing the question of how should a 
psychiatrist separate “the wheat from the tares”, Hick made three suggestions, wittily 
labelled “The Sign from Heaven”, “The Geographical”, and “The Police Method”. 
The first of these was simply  “clinical intuition or diagnostic acumen”. The second 
was based on his view that “certain parts of the British Isles seem to maintain steady 
streams of ‘bad eggs’ to the Services”. He most probably meant Ireland. Finally, “The 
Police Method” relied on “information received” and “catching the accused out in 
contradictory statements”. “Moral superiority” was “not an attitude that becomes us”, 
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he observed. It was better, he counselled, “to take what the man will give rather than 
break him because he will not give you what you want”93  
The most powerfully argued repudiation of the “new authoritarianism” in 
psychiatry came from William Needles. In an article in the 1946 volume of 
Psychiatry, Needles lambasted the cult of “return to duty” statistics, quotas for getting 
men back to the front lines, and the failure to follow-up on what happened to patients 
after evacuation. He reflected on the cruelty of one “dynamic, chest-thumping 
psychiatrist, who had never been exposed to anything more than a toy pistol” 
embarking on “pep talk number three” as he “harangued a combat-ridden soldier 
about the necessity of ‘standing up like a man’”. The title of his article told it all: 
“The Regression of Psychiatry in the Army”.94 
 
* * * 
 
 This dismal story of “hate training” is primarily a British one. Although 
America psychiatrists and psychologists weighed in with their views and assessments, 
they never introduced such emotion-driven practices in preparing their recruits for 
battle. In large part, this was because of the late entry of the US into the war and, 
especially, into battle. By the time American troops were preparing for combat, the 
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failures of the British experiment were clear. There was also a lesser strain of “hate” 
in the American war context, despite Pearl Harbor. American psychiatrists watched 
the British descent into “hate and blood training” from a safer distance. At the time of 
the training discussed here, 43,000 British civilians had been killed: American losses 
were small by comparison. The American armed forces adopted some elements of 
“realism” training while jettisoning the emotionism. 
 
 In contrast, while the psychiatric profession in Britain were conscripted into 
the war effort like every other fit and sane citizen, they struggled to define their role 
outside of the treatment of clearly mentally-ill servicepersonnel. Even in that field, 
they were criticised for confusing the mentally ill with cowards and malingerers. 
Their role in military training was equally ambivalent: they promoted it, and then 
became its chief critics. Robert Henry Ahrenfeldt, author of the classic text Psychiatry 
in the British Army During the Second World War (1958), summarized the failure of 
hate training by noting that it encouraged “uninhibited primitive instinctual and 
sadistic trends and blood-lust”. These emotions were “as ‘unnatural’ as they are 
undesirable manifestations in emotionally mature citizens of contemporary societies 
in Western civilisation”. It was also “foreign to our national character”.95 As another 
commentator put it, the “old fashioned” view of regarding the soldier as “a bundle of 
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conditioned reflexes, a belly, genitalia, and a pair of feet” had to be discarded.96 Only 
a sense of duty, spurred on by fears about what would happen if the Axis powers 
triumphed, would enable British men to put their emotional repugnancy to killing 
aside. 
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